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Abstract 
 
In a case study of six East Asian economies, we use dynamic factor analysis to estimate a 
regional component of the exchange market pressure index (EMPI) as a measure of regional 
financial stress.  The extent to which this indicator is explained by regional economic and 
financial factors is interpreted as regional vulnerability to crisis. We find that regional 
external liabilities and exuberance in domestic stock and credit markets, as well as the US 
high yield spread, were positively correlated with regional vulnerability. Individual country 
EMPIs are also explained by regional factors, with country-specific factors and trade 
linkages playing little role. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crises of the 1990s differed from those of the 1970s in a fundamental way: they 
tended to strike several countries simultaneously. The domino collapse of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992-1993, the “Tequila effect” of the Mexican crisis in 1994, 
the “Asian flu” of 1997-1998 and the turmoil in emerging and global financial markets 
following the August 1998 Russian crisis all illustrate the coincidence of financial crises in 
the last decade of the twentieth century.  Such coincidence of crises has brought to the fore a 
vigorous enquiry into the extent and reasons for interconnections between economies.     
  
The starting point of the analysis in this paper is the observation that crises have tended to be 
regional.  While the events surrounding the Russian crisis in 1998 reverberated throughout 
the world, the evidence is persuasive that countries within a geographical region are jointly 
vulnerable (Glick and Rose, 1999; Eichengreen, Hale, and Mody, 2001; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2001).   
 
In this paper we suggest a method of determining the degree of common susceptibility or 
vulnerability to crisis that may characterize a region, using six Asian economies and their 
behavior before, during and after the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s as a case study.1  In 
particular, we pursue the idea that a region such as East Asia largely presents a common 
“prospectus” to international investors.  This may be because countries within a region 
follow similar development strategies and economic policies (Rigobon, 1998).  Combined 
with investors’ need to economize on information gathering, as implied by models such as 
those presented by Calvo and Mendoza (2000), groups of countries in a particular region may 
come to represent a single corporate entity, e.g., “East Asia, Inc.”   
 
Our research may be viewed in a broad sense as a contribution to the literature on contagion. 
We prefer, however, to use the term “vulnerability” for two reasons.  First, as noted by 
Dungey and Tambakis (2003), the term “contagion” has proved to be something of an elusive 
concept, with no single received usage (see e.g. Masson, 1999; Edwards, 2000; Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 2000;  Forbes and Rigobon, 2001; Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia, 2002). More 
importantly, however,  we see vulnerability and contagion as two components that together 
form an index of common regional exchange market stress.  The component that is explained 
by movements in regional macroeconomic and financial variables we term vulnerability.  
                                                 
1 Choosing these countries as representative of the region of East Asia immediately raises 
fundamental issues as to what constitutes a region.  For example, if this were defined purely 
geographically, then our analysis ought to include other countries such as Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Hong Kong, etc. To include all countries in the geographical region would, 
however, lead to difficulties in empirical work because it would involve the estimation of 
very large dynamic systems. Hence, we have restricted ourselves to an examination of just 
six countries, but acknowledge that our research therefore can only be interpreted as a case 
study of those countries. 
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The component that is unexpected, based on the explanatory regional variables, could be 
thought of as contagion, following, for example, Masson (1999) and Edwards (2000).  
Vulnerability and contagion are thus related and, indeed, contagion may occur because of 
non-linear effects or structural shifts when vulnerability levels reach certain thresholds 
(Jeanne, 1997; Masson, 1999).   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss the dynamic 
factor analysis that we use to construct a regional stress index.  Section 3 presents the 
empirical results of our case study, reporting both the determinants of regional vulnerability 
and those of country-specific EMPIs.  A brief summary of the case study findings and the 
implications for policy and future research are presented in a final section. 
 
2. Methodological Issues  
 
The construction of our measure of regional vulnerability proceeds in three steps.  First we 
construct an index to capture the idea of devaluation probability and financial stress for each 
country, using the well known exchange market pressure index (EMPI).  Second, we employ 
dynamic factor analysis in order to extract the component of the EMPI that is common to all 
six countries under examination in our case study, which can therefore be treated as a 
measure of regional stress.  Finally, we extract the component of the regional stress index 
that can be explained by measures of macroeconomic and financial similarity among the six 
countries, and interpret this explained component as our measure of regional vulnerability. 
We provide a more extensive discussion of the final step, including the choice of variables to 
use in extracting the regional vulnerability component, in our empirical section.  In this 
section we describe in more detail first the construction of the EMPI (although only briefly, 
since this measure is well known) and then the dynamic factor analysis that we use to extract 
the regional stress index. 
 
 
2.1 The Exchange Market Pressure Index 
 
As is standard in studies of international financial crises, we begin with the well known 
exchange market pressure index originally proposed by Girton and Roper (1977) in order to 
capture the idea of devaluation probability and financial stress.  The EMPI is a weighted sum 
of exchange rate depreciation, loss of reserves, and rise in interest rates.  It measures the 
pressure on the exchange rate that may in part be absorbed by a decline in reserves or 
through an increase in domestic interest rates.  Thus, an increase in the value of a country’s 
EMPI indicates that the net demand for that country’s currency is weakening and hence that 
the currency may be liable to a speculative attack or that such an attack is already under way. 
Formally, for a country i at time t the EMPI, denoted Eit, is given by: 
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where eit, rit and iit denote, respectively, the nominal exchange rate (domestic price of foreign 
currency), level of foreign exchange reserves and short-term interest rate for country i at time 
t, and ∆ denotes the first-difference operator.  The weights α, β and λ are chosen such that 
each of the three components on the right-hand side of (1) has a standard deviation of unity, 
in order to preclude any one of them from dominating the index.  
 
 
 
2.2 Extracting the Common Factor: Dynamic Factor Analysis 
 
Having constructed the EMPI series, we wish to extract a factor that is common to the EMPI 
for each of the countries under examination as a measure of regional stress.  In order to do 
this we employ an “unobserved components,” dynamic factor analysis approach based on 
maximum likelihood Kalman filtering (Engle and Watson,1981; Harvey,1989; Cuthbertson, 
Hall and Taylor, 1992).  Let Eit be the EMPI at time t for country i, i=1,2,3,4,5,6, and let κt be 
the unobserved factor common to the EMPI of all of the crisis countries.  Then the general 
statistical system we postulate is of the form: 
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where Φ(L) and Ψ(i)(L) denote polynomials in the lag operator L, O denotes a (7×1) column 
vector of zeroes, and diag{·} denotes a square symmetric matrix with the elements of main 
diagonal given in parentheses and zeroes elsewhere.  Equation (2) partitions the EMPI for 
country i at time t, Eit, into a factor common to all six countries, κt, which we can think of as 
the regional stress index, plus a country-specific or national factor, nit .  Note that κt, is scaled 
by a country-specific parameter γ(i) in (2), so that the degree of influence of the regional 
stress index on the EMPI may vary from country to country.  According to equations (3) and 
(4) respectively, the regional stress and national factors are each assumed to have a finite-
order autoregressive representation.  This is reasonable so long as the determinants of these 
components are stationary and, therefore, by Wold’s decomposition theorem, admit a moving 
average representation that may be approximated by a finite-order autoregression.  Below, 
we shall investigate further the probable major determinants of the vulnerability factor.  In 
(5), the distribution of the disturbance terms is assumed to be Gaussian and the variance of 
innovations driving the ωt term is normalized to unity in order to identify the vulnerability 
factor. 
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If we assume that Φ(L) and Ψ(i)(L) are at most first-order,2 then the system (2)-(4) may be 
cast into state space form as follows: 
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or, more compactly as: 
 
tt FΓ=Ξ ,                 (8) 
ttt FF ζ+Λ= −1 ,                (9) 
where: 
],[~ ΣONtζ , (10) 
Σ=diag{1,σ12,σ22, σ32, σ42, σ52, σ62}.               (11) 
 
Once the system is in state space form, the Kalman filter recursions can be used to produce 
optimal estimates of the unobservable elements of the state vector Ft, conditional on 
maximum likelihood estimates of the state space parameters (Harvey, 1989).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Experiments with higher-order specifications in our empirical work led to qualitatively 
identical and quantitatively virtually identical results. 
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3. Case Study: Six East Asian Economies 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The data set is monthly for the period January 1990 through December 2001 for six East 
Asian countries—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—and 
was gathered from the International Financial Statistics data base published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), supplemented by Global Data Source, an IMF Research 
Department data base that draws on both IMF and commercial sources.  The series gathered 
included, for each country, the nominal (end-period) US dollar exchange rate, the level of 
foreign exchange reserves, nominal GDP, money supply (M2), consumer price index, a stock 
market index, a short-term interest rate (the interbank call-loan rate), the level of total foreign 
liabilities outstanding, and the level of domestic credit outstanding.  In addition, a series on 
the US high-yield interest rate spread was obtained from Bloomberg as the difference 
between the yield on US high yield bonds and the yield on the ten-year US Treasury bond; it 
thus measures the risk premium on less-than-investment-grade (or “junk”) bonds over the 
“riskless” interest rate.  Finally, a data series on the spot price of oil (West Texas 
Intermediate) was also gathered.  The reasoning underlying the choice of these variables and 
their use in our analysis is discussed below.  All the series were expressed in mean-deviation 
from prior to the analysis.    
 
 
3.2 Exchange Market Pressure Indices  
 
Figure 1 shows the EMPIs of the six countries under examination, constructed as in equation 
(1), for the period 1990-2001.  Larger values of the EMPI suggest higher stress.  Negative 
EMPIs indicate speculators’ expectations of currency appreciation rather than depreciation.  
High EMPIs in some countries prior to the 1997 Asian crisis indicate that these countries had 
in fact been exposed to the danger of crisis but that attacks had been staved off.  Figure 1 also 
shows the common or regional component of the EMPI across the six countries  
 
 
 
3.3 The Regional Stress Factor 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the state space form (2)-(5) are 
reported in Table 1 and the implied level of common or regional stress is displayed in Figure 
1.3  The regional stress level is especially high during the height of the crisis, June 1997 to 
January 1998. The index remains near zero or negative in most other periods except for a 
                                                 
3 We used the unsmoothed Kalman filter estimates of the unobservable factors, since using 
the smoothed estimates would introduce additional moving average structures into the 
factors. 
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slight increase during the Mexican crisis in 1994.  Negative values of the stress index may be 
interpreted as indicating regional optimism from the point of view of international investors. 
 
The charts in Figure 1 and the estimation results in Table 1 reveal that the regional stress 
factor plays an important role in driving the exchange market pressure indices of all of the 
East Asian countries examined.  In particular, the estimated γ(i) parameters, which measure 
the importance of common regional stress in driving the EMPI in each country, are in every 
case strongly significantly different from zero at conventional nominal test sizes.  The degree 
of variation in each country’s EMPI explained by the regional stress factor alone (the R2 
statistics shown in the final column) ranges from 21 percent for Thailand, to 70 percent for 
the Philippines.4   
 
 
 
3.4 Analyzing the sources of vulnerability 
 
What factors contribute to the predictable component of κt and hence drive regional 
vulnerability?  In this connection, it is worth recalling that, in contrast to previous balance of 
payments-cum-currency crises where economic misalignment had resulted in either large 
fiscal deficits or gross misalignment of exchange rates, the macroeconomic performance of 
most of the East Asian economies prior to the 1997-98 crisis was exemplary.5 Most of the 
countries concerned ran either balanced or surplus fiscal accounts, and high private sector 
savings funded internationally exceptional rates of investment.  Even where rising investment 
surpassed savings, driving the current account into deficit, the fact that current account 
deficits appeared to be investment driven rather than consumption driven appeared 
comforting.  Similarly, East Asian monetary policies appeared to be coping well before the 
crisis, with reported inflation rates tightly under control and strong levels of economic 
activity.  Thus, “first-generation” and “second-generation” currency crisis models (Flood and 
Marion, 1999) were not seen as appropriate indicators of the range of fundamental variables 
to consider. 
Instead, therefore, our choice of potentially influential fundamental variables was largely 
informed by the literature on the widely held “moral hazard” or “third generation” view of 
                                                 
4 These R2 statistics were conducted as the coefficient of determination in a regression of the 
EMPI of each country onto the extracted regional stress index.  Given that the regional and 
national components of the EMPI were constructed to be orthogonal, this gives an accurate 
measure of the degree of variation of the country EMPI explained by the regional factor. 
5 Chinn (2000) examines a group of East Asian currencies immediately prior to the 1997-98 
crisis and concludes that only that only the Thai baht shows evidence of external 
overvaluation relative, based on traditional purchasing power parity and monetary 
fundamentals, whilst Chinn (1999) and Chinn and Dooley (1999) find slightly more mixed 
results. 
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the underlying causes of the East Asian crisis (see e.g. McKinnon and Pill, 1996; Krugman, 
1998;  Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Agénor, Miller 
and Vines, 1999; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a).6  According to the “moral hazard” view, a 
crucial role in the East Asian crisis was played by financial intermediaries whose liabilities 
were perceived as having an implicit government guarantee, but which were essentially 
unregulated.  This therefore created a moral hazard problem, in which financial 
intermediaries were able to raise money at low rates of interest and then lend it at much 
higher rates to finance risky investments, thereby generating strong asset price inflation, 
sustained by a circular process in which the proliferation of risky lending drove up the prices 
of risky assets, making the financial condition of these institutions appear to be sounder than 
it actually was. At some point, however, the bubble bursts and the mechanics of the crisis is 
then described by the same circular process in reverse: asset prices begin to fall; making the 
insolvency of financial intermediaries highly visible; forcing them to cease operations and 
generating increasingly fast asset price deflation; leading to actual or incipient capital flight 
as asset prices collapse. 
 
This description appears to fit the facts of the East Asian crisis well (Sarno and Taylor, 
1999a), and suggests that movements in asset prices and measures of financial imbalance 
would be strong candidates to explain regional vulnerability.  Indeed, financial imbalances in 
many of the crisis countries had created increasingly illiquid and insolvent corporate and 
banking sectors.   
 
For these reasons, we examined external and domestic financial variables that could reflect 
such regional vulnerabilities.  The corporate and financial sector imbalances developed due 
to the nexus of three factors: the inflow of reversible foreign capital, which created both 
maturity and currency mismatches; the accumulation of domestic private debt; and weak 
financial regulation and opaque reporting practices, which contributed to excessive 
investment in unproductive assets.  Capital inflows per se do not create financial instability, 
but when these inflows serve as a main source by which to fund high levels of domestic 
credit, reliance on them could render the market vulnerable because of the high degree of 
reversibility of portfolio flows and bank lending (Sarno and Taylor, 1999a, 1999b). Thus, a 
growing stock of external liabilities is clearly a source of concern to investors.  Second, 
domestic credit growth, and in particular real domestic credit growth, can be associated with 
unproductive investments and, thus, viewed as unsustainable.  There appears to be some 
empirical support for this view;  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, show that rapid 
growth of domestic credit helps predict financial crisis, and rapid domestic credit growth also 
                                                 
6 The “insurance model” of crisis due originally to Dooley (1997) and analyzed empirically 
by Chinn, Dooley and Shrestha (1999) also suggests that asset market booms are likely to be 
followed by capital flight and that rapid expansion of domestic credit and foreign liabilities 
will tend to be associated with currency crises. 
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finds a role in various post-mortem accounts of the Asian crisis (e.g. Bank for International 
Settlements 1998, Chapter VII).7     
 
Similarly, to the extent that a boom in stock market prices, adjusted for inflation, is not based 
on fundamentals, it could similarly raise concerns with respect to future vulnerability. 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and Sarno and Taylor (1999a), for example, provide 
strong empirical evidence that stock market booms tend to precurse future exchange rate 
crises for a number of East Asian countries.  
 
We also include a “global” risk factor, the US high-yield spread, on the basis that this is not 
only is a proxy for international investors’ attitude towards risk, but is also a leading 
indicator of US economic activity (Gertler and Lown, 1999; Mody and Taylor, 2003, 2004). 
Gertler and Lown (1999), reasoning on the basis of the theory of the “financial accelerator”, 
argue that a rise in the spread (and, hence, in the external costs of borrowing) reflects a 
lowering of the collateral value that borrowing firms can offer.  In turn, this reduced 
collateral results from downgrading of growth prospects.  Since exports to the United States 
play an important role in East Asian economic activity, it is not surprising that the prospect 
of a slowdown in the US reduces the net demand for East Asian currencies.  Mody and 
Taylor (2002) find that a rise in US high yield spread leads to a significant curtailment of 
capital flows to emerging markets (and, indeed, its influence overshadows that of US interest 
rates). 
 
In short, therefore, the final set of macroeconomic and financial variables that we settled on 
as potential drivers of the degree of vulnerability for these six East Asian economies included 
percentage monthly changes in the real (consumer price index-deflated) stock market index, 
the level of total foreign liabilities as a proportion of GDP, the ratio of M2 money supply to 
GDP (inverse velocity), and percentage monthly changes in the level of domestic credit 
outstanding in real terms.  In order to obtain a measure of regional similarity in these 
macroeconomic fundamentals, we used the Kalman filtering method outlined above to 
extract a regional common factor for each of these series, and the results of this dynamic 
factor analysis are given in Tables 2-5. In addition, we included the US high yield spread as 
well as an interaction term involving the product of the change in the high yield spread and 
the regional component of growth in the real value of domestic credit and, as a further global 
factor, the monthly change in the spot oil price. 
                                                 
7 Chinn and Dooley (1997) find some evidence that rapid expansion of bank lending 
increases the riskiness of marginal projects for a set of Pacific Rim countries. In an analysis 
of EMPI movements for several emerging market economies, Tanner (2001, p. 318) finds 
that growth of domestic credit and a rise in the EMPI have gone together.  He notes, for 
example, that starting around mid-1997, both the EMPI and domestic credit rose in Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Korea, “suggesting that the crises were foreshadowed by a period of loose 
monetary policy.” 
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Having extracted the regional common factor of each of these series (except for the global 
variables) across the six countries concerned, we then regressed the common regional stress 
factor onto the current value and three lagged values of each of the macro fundamental 
common factors.8  Interestingly, all of the current values of the macro common factors 
appeared significant in the regression, although of the lagged common factors, only the first 
lag of the change in the real stock market index was significant and the oil price term did not 
yield an estimated coefficient significantly different from zero at even the ten percent level.  
 
The resulting estimated regression equation was therefore of the form: 
 
tttttt 5
(1.8841)
4.82244
(0.2017)
0.42883
(0.1162)
0.21012
(2.7365)
6.61391
(1.4420)
3.30461
(1.4762)
5.2263ˆ 1-t µµµµµµκ ++++−−=  
 
R2=0.26, DW=1.17, Chow(>6/97)=0.4216, Hausman=0.2812,          (12) 
 
where figures in parentheses denote estimated standard errors and where: 
 
tκˆ   =  explained component of the regional stress index (i.e. regional vulnerability), 
µ1t = common factor of monthly log-change in real value of the stock market index, 
µ2t = common factor of logarithm of ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP, 
µ3t = common factor of logarithm of ratio of M2 to GDP, 
µ4t = common factor of monthly log-change in real value of domestic credit,  
µ5t = monthly change in the U.S. high-yield spread multiplied by µ4t, 
R2 = coefficient of determination, 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic, 
Chow(>6/97) =   p-value of a Chow test for a structural break in the parameters after June  
   1997,  
                                                 
8 Note that the estimated standard errors in these equations are conditional on the estimated 
state space parameters as the extracted common factors are generated regressors.  In 
principle, this could have been avoided by combining the state space form for the EMPIs and 
for the each of the macro fundamental variables into a single state space form and estimating 
all of the state space parameters and the factor loadings in a single step.  (This system could 
also be extended to allow for a common shock that impacts upon all markets—see Dungey, 
Fry, Gonzàlez-Hermosillo and Martin, 2002.)  Indeed, we did spend some time in attempting 
to estimate this system.  The problem with this approach in practice is that it involves 
extremely high dimensionality of the resulting state space form and a very large number of 
unknown parameters to be estimated simultaneously (approximately one hundred).  This 
initially generated a severe problem with available computer memory; this was eventually 
overcome but the maximum likelihood Kalman filtering estimation procedure did not prove 
stable with such a high-dimensional system.  This remains a possible avenue for future 
research, however. 
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Hausman  =    p-value of a Hausman (1978) test for exogeneity of the current-dated   
  regressors.9 
 
It is interesting to note that similarity in financial indicators is capable of explaining 26 
percent of the variation in the regional stress index, and that indicators such as the ratio of 
total foreign liabilities to GDP, inverse velocity and changes in the level of real domestic 
credit enter with significant and positive coefficients.10  Note also, that a test for a structural 
break after June 1997 (the onset of the East Asian crisis) is insignificant.  Most interestingly, 
the interaction of the change in real domestic credit and the US high-yield spread enters 
positively and significantly.  Thus, to the extent that credit growth in excess of inflation 
implies a loose monetary policy, as suggested by Tanner (2001), or is associated with 
likelihood of unproductive investments, the implication is that such domestic vulnerability is 
aggravated by the joint effects of a larger premium being required by international investors 
for holding risky assets, and by the prediction of poorer export prospects on account of 
slower expected US growth which a rise in the high-yield spread predicts. The fitted values 
from this estimation seem to track well the actual values of the regional stress index (Figure 2 
panel a).  Note also that there does not appear to be any strong evidence of endogeneity of 
the right-hand-side regressors on the basis of a Hausman (1978) specification test. This is 
important because one might suspect that causality may at times run from, say, a rise in 
regional stress to movements in the stock market or even in the US high-yield spread, rather 
than vice versa.  However, these reverse-causation effects do not appear to be strongly 
statistically significant.   
 
One shortcoming of this estimated equation, however, is the evidence of first-order serial 
correlation, as shown by the low value of the Durbin-Watson statistic, even though we 
included lagged values of the macro fundamental variables.  Accordingly, we re-estimated 
the equation with one lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side.  This led to the 
lagged change in the real stock market index and the inverse velocity factor becoming 
insignificant, so that the resulting final equation was: 
 
1
(0.0729)
0.51695
(1.7651)
5.17354
(0.0918)
0.20122
(2.3456)
5.61521
(1.3072)
3.4443ˆ −++++−= tttttt κµµµµκ  
 
R2=0.43, h=0.74, Chow(>6/97)=0.5357, Hausman=0.2134.   (13) 
                                                 
9 The Hausman test for exogeneity of the regressors was constructed using the method 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), with two lagged values of all variables in 
(12) (or, below, (13)) used as the instrument set. 
10 The estimated standard errors in this equation should be treated with caution since they are 
conditional on the estimates of the parameters of the state space form that was used to 
construct the generated regressors.  See footnote 8. 
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The increase in the goodness of fit and the improved dynamic correspondence between the 
fitted estimates (i.e. the vulnerability index) and the actual values of the regional stress index 
is perhaps not surprising, (Figure 2 panel b);  the first-order serial correlation has, however, 
disappeared (the statistic h=0.74, is Durbin’s h statistic11) and again there is no sign of a 
structural break post-June 1997 on the basis of Chow test and the Hausman test does not 
reject exogeneity of the regressors.12  Also, we once more see that the interaction term 
involving the product of the US high-yield spread and changes in the real level of domestic 
credit enters strongly significantly.13   
 
In Figure 2 panel c we have graphed the contribution of the interaction term in equation (13) 
(i.e. 5.1735µ5t) together with the regional stress index itself: clearly, the interaction term 
tracks the regional stress index well, especially around the 1997-98 crisis period.  Growth in 
the real value of domestic credit clearly had a strong influence on regional financial stress, 
especially in combination with a rising value of the US high yield spread. 
 
 
3.5 The dynamic interaction of regional stress and common macro fundamentals  
 
We next investigated the dynamic interaction between the regional stress index and the 
macro similarity variables by estimating small vector autoregressions (VARs).  Our 
investigation of the relationship between macroeconomic and financial similarity and 
vulnerability (i.e. the component of regional stress which could be explained by the 
fundamentals) indicated the importance of the interaction between domestic credit and 
changes in the US high-yield spread.  In estimating a VAR, however, since our ultimate aim 
was to produce impulse-response functions for the regional stress index in response to shocks 
to the macroeconomic and financial similarity variables, we were reluctant to include both 
changes in domestic credit and the interaction term in the same VAR since this would make 
interpretation of the impulse-response functions problematic because of the nonlinear 
relationship between these two variables.  Accordingly, we estimated two systems: System 1, 
                                                 
11 Durbin’s h statistic, which is valid in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, is 
distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation of 
the residuals. 
12 It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
(0.5169) is much higher than the estimated simple first-order autocorrelation coefficient 
resulting from the dynamic factor analysis reported in Table 1 (0.1846). On reflection, 
however, the fact that the two coefficients differ is not surprising since, given (12) and the 
autocorrelation of the regional stress index, the lagged dependent variable is clearly 
correlated with the other regressors in (13). 
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which included the regional stress index (κt) and the regional common factors of the changes 
in the real stock market index (µ1t), of the ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP (µ2t), and 
the interaction between changes in the high-yield spread and the common factor of changes 
in real domestic credit (µ5t); and System 2, which included κt, µ1t, µ2t and the regional 
common factor of changes in real domestic credit, µ4t.14    
 
We estimated a first-order VAR for both systems.15 We then used the estimated VARs to 
construct impulse-response functions.16   We have graphed the response of the regional stress 
index to shocks to itself and to each of the three macro similarity variables derived from 
Systems 1 and 2 in Figure 3.  These impulse-response functions can in fact be interpreted as 
the response of regional vulnerability to innovations in each of the fundamentals variables 
since, by definition, movements in the regional stress index which are explained by 
movements in the fundamentals are in fact the same as movements in vulnerability. 
 
Interestingly, the impulse-responses of regional stress with respect to shocks to itself and to 
µ1t and µ2t seem little affected by the choice of VAR and, moreover, each of the impulse-
response functions show an interesting pattern capable of entirely intuitive interpretation.  
The impulse-response of the regional stress index to own shocks mean reverts toward zero 
with a half-life of between two and three months.  Since this movement is conditional on 
holding the macro similarity variables constant, this may be interpreted as a measure of the 
degree to which pure market sentiment, independent of the fundamentals, affects the regional 
stress index.   
 
                                                 
14 In fact, we found that the impulse-response functions obtained with all the variables, 
including both µ4t and µ5t, in the VAR were qualitatively extremely similar to those we 
report below for the two separate systems, which is not surprising since µ4t and µ5t do not 
have a high degree of linear dependence.  Nevertheless, we prefer to report the results 
obtained using the two systems, in order to make clear the interpretation of the impulse-
response functions.  
15 The first-order VARs appeared adequate in the sense that there was no evidence of 
remaining serial correlation in the residuals, although the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
did in fact suggest a third-order VAR in both cases. The tendency of the AIC to 
overparameterize and choose higher-order VARs is, however, well known, and a first-order 
system did seem more consistent with the dynamic factor and regression analysis reported 
elsewhere in the paper.  However, as a check, we also carried out the impulse-response 
analysis with the third-order systems and this resulted in almost identical results.  
16 We used an orthogonalization of the VAR innovations based on a standard Cholesky 
decomposition, with the variables in the ordering κt -µ1t- µ2t-µ5t for System 1 and κt-µ1t- µ2t- 
µ4t for System 2, although alternative orderings (with κt first) did not materially affect the 
results. 
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The impulse response of regional stress (and hence vulnerability) to movements in the stock 
market index is also very interesting: although the effect for the first few periods is to reduce  
vulnerability—consistent with our single-equation regression results—the net long-term 
effect is in fact to raise regional vulnerability.  As would be expected, an increase in total 
foreign liabilities as a proportion of GDP raises vulnerability in both the short run and the 
long run.   
 
Shocks to the interaction between domestic credit and changes in the high-yield spread also 
tend to raise the vulnerability index in both the short run and the long run.  Comparing 
Figures 3(a) and 3(b), however, it is interesting to note that shocks to the interactive term 
indicate a much more acute effect on regional vulnerability in the short run than do shocks to 
domestic credit alone.   
 
 
3.6 The role of macro similarity in explaining individual country EMPIs 
 
The next step in our investigation was an analysis of the extent to which the common factors 
in the macro fundamentals are capable of explaining movements in individual country 
EMPIs.  We did this by regressing the individual country EMPIs onto the same set of 
variables as in regression equation (13), except that the individual country lagged EMPI 
replaces the lagged regional stress index.  The results are given in Table 6.  Interestingly, in 
most cases the variables enter with strongly significant coefficients which are the same sign 
as those reported in equation (13). 
 
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 6 report the marginal significance level, or p-value, of an F-test of 
the significance of adding in the country-specific components of the macro fundamental 
variables into the regression, both for the post-1998 (i.e. post-crisis) period and for the pre-
1999 period.  In nearly every case, these p-values indicate that the national factors are 
insignificant in explaining movements in individual country EMPIs, although the marginal 
significance levels do appear to shrink post 1998, perhaps indicating a move towards greater 
importance of national factors.  This is especially evident in the case of Thailand, which in 
fact has a p-value for the post-1998 period significantly less than 5 percent.  Closer 
examination of the Thai regression reveals that it is the national component of the change in 
real domestic credit that is strongly significantly different from zero, with a marginal 
significance level of the t-ratio of the estimated coefficient of 0.0003.  Testing for the 
significance of the remaining three national factors yielded a marginal significance level of 
0.20. 
 
 
3.7 The role of trade linkages 
 
Finally, we examined the importance of trade linkages in explaining individual country 
EMPIs, once the influence of macro similarity had been accounted for, since there has been 
some debate in the literature as to whether contagion may be linked to the degree of trade 
integration among countries (see e.g. Glick and Rose, 1999;  Taylor, 1999;  Van Rijckeghem 
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and Weder, 2001;  Forbes, 2001).  To do this, we constructed measures of trade integration 
suggested by Fratzscher (1999).17  This variable was constructed on a monthly basis for each 
of the six countries under investigation, with respect to each of the other five countries, for 
our sample period.  We then added the five trade linkage variables together for each country 
to provide and overall measure of trade linkage of each of the countries under examination 
with the other five countries over the sample period.18    
 
In the final column of Table 6, we report the p-value resulting from a t-test of the 
significance of this variable when it is added into the EMPI regression for each of the 
individual countries, controlling for the international common components of the macro 
fundamental series.  In each case, the marginal significance levels indicate that the variable is 
not significant at standard significance levels. 
 
The fact that trade linkages do not appear significant in explaining movements in the EMPI 
over time should not, however, be taken as contradicting the findings of Glick and Rose 
(1999), who find that trade linkages are significant in explaining contagion.  As noted earlier 
in our discussion, the “contagious crises” literature asks a different question from that posed 
in the present analysis, namely, given that a crisis has occurred, who else is most likely to be 
affected?  In the present study, we are primarily examining the vulnerability of a region to 
the occurrence of a crisis.    
 
 
4.  Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have presented a case study of the six Asian countries most severely 
affected by the1997 currency crisis—Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Korea—in an analysis of the vulnerability of a region to exchange rate crisis.  
Our ultimate aim has been to contribute to an understanding of how crises may be prevented, 
rather than an understanding of how they spread.19  
 
                                                 
17 See Fratzscher (1999) for details. Fratzscher’s index is designed to capture both the degree 
of competition in third markets—which here includes industrialized countries (US, Europe 
and Japan), developing countries (Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Western 
Hemisphere), and other regions—as well as the degree of bilateral trade between countries. 
The first factor captures the exposure of a country to a competitor‘s devaluation in selling to 
a third market, while the second factor captures the more direct effects of devaluation on 
bilateral trade.   
18 Trade data was obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics.  We are grateful to Jung Yeon Kim for help in constructing these indices. 
19 See Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) for a similar notion of “vulnerability.”   
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In particular, we constructed a measure of regional financial stress for these countries using 
dynamic factor analysis which partitions the EMPIs of the six countries into a common or 
regional component and a country-specific, idiosyncratic component.  We have also shown 
how this regional stress index can be further partitioned into a component that is predictable 
given the underlying regional measures of macro and financial similarity (leading to a 
measure of regional vulnerability) and a part that is unexpected based on the fundamentals (a 
residual measure that could be interpreted as regional contagion).   
 
To summarize our empirical results briefly, regional vulnerability in these six East Asian 
countries appeared to arise in the context of regional accumulation of foreign liabilities and 
the rapid growth of domestic credit and stock market prices.  Global, or “monsoonal,” effects 
were proxied by the rise in risk premia in financial markets, which signal also a slowdown in 
US growth, amplifying the vulnerabilities on account of credit growth.  There was no 
evidence of a structural change in the sources of vulnerability following the Asian crisis.  Our 
results also suggest that individual country EMPIs are also explained by the common 
regional factors that drive the level of regional vulnerability.  Country-specific factors played 
almost no role, with the exception of Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Singapore (both in the 
post-crisis period).   
 
Our case study therefore reveals that the six countries in question were indeed characterized 
by a pre-existing degree of common vulnerability prior to the 1997-98 crisis.  This is of 
interest for at least two reasons.  First, it aids in our understanding of the East Asian crisis.  
Second, if this finding generalizes to other crises and geographical regions (and perhaps also 
to a wider definition of a geographical region), then the implications for policymakers in any 
particular country are that they need to be concerned not only about their own level of 
vulnerability, but should also monitor and, possibly safeguard against, financial imbalances 
in the rest of the region.  For international financial institutions, multilateral surveillance 
takes on greater importance. 
 
We end, therefore, with a call for further work on this issue.  We have been careful to stress 
that the research reported in this paper can only be interpreted as a case study of six 
particular East Asian economies and the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Although the 
results of this case study are illuminating and suggest that our approach is potentially of 
policy significance, further research is necessary in order to establish the general 
applicability and usefulness of these methods. In particular, further work might usefully test 
the dynamic common factor approach in the context of other geographical regions (e.g. Latin 
America) or in the context of expanding the number of countries examined. 
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Figure 1.  Exchange Market Pressure Index
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Figure 2.  Explaining Common Regional Stress
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Figure 3.  Impulse Response Functions of Regional Stress
(a) System 1
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Table 1:  State Space Parameter Estimation Results:  Exchange Market Pressure Index 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
R2 of 
Common 
Component 
R2 
- - - φ 0.1846 0.5143 - - -   
γ (1)   0.4699 0.1034 Ψ(1) 0.1151 0.3045 σ21 2.8836 1.0032 R12 0.29
γ(2) 12.4633 2.3254 Ψ(2) 0.1088 0.2098 σ22 4.8749 1.9632 R22 0.33
γ(3) 10.5574 2.1194 Ψ(3) 0.4059 0.1174 σ23 2.1963 0.9053 R32 0.40
γ(4)   5.0734 1.0043 Ψ(4) 0.5205 0.1947 σ24 1.8764 0.8176 R42 0.70
γ(5)   3.7972 0.8521 Ψ(5) 0.1430 0.0221 σ25 1.4137 0.6542 R52 0.25
γ(6) 40.5731 3.8862 Ψ(6) 0.3300 0.1241 σ26 3.1115 0.6658 R62 0.21
Note:  R2i denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable 
onto the extracted common factor for country i, with 1=Indonesia, 2=Korea, 3=Malaysia, 
4=Philippines, 5=Singapore, 6=Thailand. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  State Space Parameter Estimation Results:  Real Stock Market Changes 
 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
Error 
R2 of 
Comm. 
Compt. 
R2 
- - - Φ 0.4426 0.2033 - - -   
γ(1)   0.9472 0.4176 Ψ(1) 0.0855 0.0321 σ21 0.0135 0.0052 R12 0.35
γ(2)   8.0237 2.3764 Ψ(2) 0.0320 0.0118 σ22 0.0090 0.0042 R22 0.39
γ(3)   9.9100 2.8345 Ψ(3) 0.0847 0.0203 σ23 0.0068 0.0033 R32 0.55
γ(4) 16.6847 6.3754 Ψ(4) 0.2322 0.1008 σ24 0.0052 0.0022 R42 0.80
γ(5)   6.8947 1.1435 Ψ(5) 0.1090 0.0347 σ25 0.1827 0.0662 R52 0.55
γ(6) 35.3404 9.7312 Ψ(6) 0.2175 0.1020 σ26 0.3077 0.1442 R62 0.54
Note:  R2i denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable 
onto the extracted common factor for country i, with 1=Indonesia, 2=Korea, 3=Malaysia, 
4=Philippines, 5=Singapore, 6=Thailand. 
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Table 3:  State Space Parameter Estimation Results:  Ratio of Total Foreign Liabilities 
to Nominal GDP 
 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
Error 
R2 of 
Comm. 
Compt. 
R2 
- - - Φ 0.6034 0.2334 - - -   
γ(1) 1.7771 0.5621 Ψ(1) 0.2152 0.1123 σ21 0.2123 0.1003 R12 0.29
γ(2) 3.2213 1.1331 Ψ(2) 0.2981 0.1432 σ22 0.2621 0.1326 R22 0.26
γ(3) 4.1239 2.0003 Ψ(3) 0.2315 0.1183 σ23 0.0981 0.0224 R32 0.23
γ(4) 8.9991 3.1123 Ψ(4) 0.2411 0.1221 σ24 0.0991 0.0221 R42 0.11
γ(5) 5.6673 2.1561 Ψ(5) 0.2318 0.1010 σ25 0.4146 0.2153 R52 0.05
γ(6) 9.8899 4.6391 Ψ(6) 0.3159 0.1235 σ26 0.4733 0.2236 R62 0.20
Note:  R2i denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable 
onto the extracted common factor for country i, with 1=Indonesia, 2=Korea, 3=Malaysia, 
4=Philippines, 5=Singapore, 6=Thailand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  State Space Parameter Estimation Results:  Changes in Real Domestic Credit 
 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
R2 of 
Comm. 
Compt. 
R2 
- - - Φ 0.4510 0.2031 - - -   
γ(1)   0.7018 0.3113 Ψ(1) 0.1296 0.0431 σ21 0.0130 0.0067 R12 0.79
γ(2) 10.0446 3.4221 Ψ(2) 0.5063 0.2249 σ22 0.3279 0.1432 R22 0.11
γ(3)   7.8648 2.6425 Ψ(3) 0.2085 0.1127 σ23 0.4740 0.2034 R32 0.13
γ(4)   7.9067 2.7447 Ψ(4) 0.1083 0.0623 σ24 0.8598 0.4256 R42 0.17
γ(5)   4.3942 1.2151 Ψ(5) 0.2197 0.1134 σ25 0.9364 0.3346 R52 0.15
γ(6) 12.4753 5.3344 Ψ(6) 0.5359 0.2615 σ26 0.5465 0.2352 R62 0.32
Note:  R2i denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable 
onto the extracted common factor for country i, with 1=Indonesia, 2=Korea, 3=Malaysia, 
4=Philippines, 5=Singapore, 6=Thailand. 
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Table 5:  State Space Parameter Estimation Results:  Ratio of M2 to GDP 
 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
Error 
Param. Estimate Stand. 
 Error 
R2 of 
Comm. 
Compt. 
R2 
- - - Φ 0.6422 0.2270 - - -   
γ(1)   0.8156 0.3416 Ψ(1) 0.2153 0.1013 σ21 0.0177 0.0061 R12 0.73
γ(2)   8.1952 3.9228 Ψ(2) 0.5155 0.2413 σ22 0.3142 0.1553 R22 0.41
γ(3)   8.1265 3.8873 Ψ(3) 0.2144 0.1143 σ23 0.4521 0.2152 R32 0.66
γ(4)   6.4432 2.9853 Ψ(4) 0.1432 0.0631 σ24 0.7861 0.3734 R42 0.73
γ(5)   2.1123 1.0338 Ψ(5) 0.2248 0.1133 σ25 0.8355 0.3124 R52 0.21
γ(6) 16.8913 4.3899 Ψ(6) 0.6349 0.2816 σ26 0.5671 0.2445 R62 0.67
Note:  R2i denotes the coefficient of determination in a regression of the country variable 
onto the extracted common factor for country i, with 1=Indonesia, 2=Korea, 3=Malaysia, 
4=Philippines, 5=Singapore, 6=Thailand. 
 
 
Table 6:  Individual Country EMPI Regressions 
 
Country Lagged 
EMPI 
Stock 
market 
change  
Total 
foreign 
liabilities 
to GDP 
Domestic 
credit 
change 
Change in 
high-yield 
spread * 
domestic 
credit 
change 
R2 National 
Factors  
Pre-
1999 
p-value 
National 
Factors 
Post-
1998 
p-value 
Trade 
p-
value 
Indonesia  0.1727 
(0.0912) 
 -14.0331 
 (6.4432) 
 0.2641 
(0.0771) 
  9.5933 
(3.6313) 
  48.3141 
(16.5805) 
0.18 0.8739 0.2012 0.6969 
Korea  0.4597 
(0.0833) 
 -66.6453 
(26.1594) 
 2.2226 
(1.6871) 
  7.1364 
(3.1003) 
  38.3392 
(20.7661) 
0.23 0.9710 0.3142 0.1091 
Malaysia 0.1297 
(0.0817) 
-66.2690 
(23.0265) 
1.9307 
(0.9912) 
11.5633 
(3.9390) 
18.8082 
(8.4910) 
0.15 0.7277 0.2561 0.7380 
Philippines 0.3761 
(0.1991) 
-67.8627 
(20.5311) 
1.6647 
(2.2349) 
7.0759 
(3.4568) 
6.5373 
(2.9810) 
0.19 0.3841 0.1777 0.5049 
Singapore 0.0336 
(0.0890) 
-32.7606 
(12.3321) 
7.4286 
(3.3915) 
18.1095 
(5.1403) 
10.0356 
(4.05299) 
0.18 0.1123 0.0914 0.5880 
Thailand 0.0546 
(0.0825) 
-29.6951 
(12.2843) 
6.3382 
(2.4313) 
14.9619 
(3.7293) 
20.4199 
(9.1238) 
0.23 0.2300 0.003 0.1051 
 
Note:  Dependent variable is the individual country EMPI.  Columns 2-5 give estimated 
coefficients for lagged EMPI and various extracted common macro factors, with standard 
errors given in parentheses; R2 in column 6 gives the coefficient of determination of this 
regression.  Column 7 gives the p-value of an F-test of the significance of adding the national 
components of each of the macro variables to the regression for the pre-1999 period, while 
column 7 gives the p-value of an F-test of the significance of adding the national components 
of each of the macro variables to the regression for the post-1998 period.  Column 8 gives the 
p-value of a t-test of the significance of adding a trade linkage variable to the regression.  
